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Articles 
REGULATING GENETIC DESTINY: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 
by 
Anne Lawton· 
[O]ne by one the eggs were transferred from their test-
tubes to the larger containers; deftly the peritoneal lining 
was slit, the morula dropped into place, the saline solution 
poured in ... and already the bottle had passed, and it was 
the turn of the labellers. Heredity, date of fertilization, 
membership of Bokanovsky Group-details were trans-
ferred from test-tube to bottle. No longer anonymous, but 
named, identified, the procession marched slowly on; on 
through an opening in the wall, slowly on into the Social 
Predestination Room. 
-Aldous Huxleyl 
INTRODUCTION 
Aldous Huxley's Brave New World paints a dark picture of a 
future society that deifies scientific progress. In Huxley's ''Uto-
pia," science controls individual opportunity and, hence, destiny. 
Heredity shapes the individual's place in society, so that from 
the moment of conception, a person's destiny is predetermined, 
molded by his or her genetic blueprint. 
Sadly, Huxley's Utopia has become more than a mere story of 
science fiction. From the eugenics movemene to Hitler's obses-
* Anne Lawton, -Assistant Professor, Miami University. Copyright 1997. All rights 
reserved. 
1 ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 5-6 (1932). 
2 See ARTHUR ROGERS & DENIS DURAND DE BOUSINGEN, BIOETHICS IN EUROPE 17-31 
(1995) for a history of the eugenics movement. 
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sion with a "master race," to the more recent interest in race-
based theories of intelligence, genetic determinism has waxed 
and waned in popularity during the past century. 
The initiation of the Human Genome Project,3 an internation-
al, collaborative scientific endeavor to determine the locations 
and functions of human genes that code for inherited genetic 
traits, has revived old concerns about the uses of scientific 
knowledge and the limitations of scientific inquiry. Determining 
the locations and functions of human genes has vast implications 
for medicine's ability to combat genetically induced or influenced 
disease. 
But some of the known or alleged developments of 
[scientists' and practitioners'] work are taking or could 
potentially take a dangerous turn, as a result of a distortion 
of the original objectives. Science, with its new complexity 
and extensive ramifications, thus presents a dark side or a 
bright side according to how it is used.4 
That dark side includes both benign use and intentional misuse 
of genetic information by employers and insurers for commercial 
interests. 
Since Huxley's time, corporations have grown both in physical 
size and economic influence. Corporations, both public and pri-
vate, control access to good jobs. Good jobs provide opportunities 
for financial security and social status. Insurance, in turn, pro-
vides individuals with a safety net in times of financial distress. 
Limiting employment prospects and insurance coverage on the 
basis of genetic information forecloses opportunity and leads to a 
form of genetic determinism: a person's genetic blueprint at 
·' For a more detailed discussion of the Human Genome Project, see OFFICE OF 
TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, MAPPING OUR GENES: GE-
NOME PROJECTS: HOW BIG, HOW FAST? 7-10 (1988) [hereinafter OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY]. 
4 Explanatory Report to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Directorate of Legal Affairs, DIR/JUR 
(97) 1, 'll 2 at 4, 36 I.L.M. 817, 826 ["Explanatory Report"]. 
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conception predetermines the opportunities available during his 
or her lifetime. 
This Article examines and compares the legal framework de-
veloping in Europe and in the United States on the use of genet-
ic information by employers and insurers. Having the ability to 
screen for particular genetic traits and/or disorders raises pro-
found questions about commercial uses of genetic information. 
For example, should employers be able to test for certain genetic 
traits or have access to prospective or current employees' genetic 
test results in order to screen for a healthier workforce? Should 
insurance companies be allowed to question applicants about 
genetic predisposition to disease? Should insurance companies be 
permitted to condition the fulfillment of contracts for health, life, 
or disability insurance on the successful completion of certain 
genetic tests? 
An examination of European and United States law reveals 
that neither the Europeans nor the Americans have answered all 
of the questions raised about the proper uses of genetic infor-
mation. Public policymakers continue to grapple with these im-
portant issues. Nonetheless, a comparison of the approaches 
taken by Europe and the United States reveals two fundamental 
differences. First, the Council of Europe, a pan-European human 
rights organization composed of thirty-eight member states,5 has 
5 The Council of Europe should not be confused with the European Union. The 
Council of Europe has 38 member states, all of which are also members of the European 
Union. Established in 1949, the Council of Europe serves three main functions: it protects 
fundamental human rights and democratic pluralism, promotes European cooperation on 
solving social ills, and fosters appreciation of Europe's "multicultural identity." STATUTE 
OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, May 5, 1949, art. 1(a), (b), 87 U.N.T.S. 103, 104-105 ["STAT-
UTE"]; Diane Pinto, The Council of Europe in Action, in SECURING THE EURO-ATLANTIC 
BRIDGE: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 27 (John Edwin Mrox et al. 
eds., 1993). 
Thus, unlike the European Union, which was established primarily to promote pan-
European economic unity, the Council of Europe focuses on promotion and protection of 
political, social, and cultural rights. Headquartered in Strasbourg, France, the Council of 
Europe operates through its Committee of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly. See 
STATUTE, supra, arts. 10, 11. 
The entry into force in 1950 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms began the human rights work of the Council of Europe. The 
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undertaken a comprehensive study of the issues implicated by 
genetic research. By comparison, although the Human Genome 
Project within the United States has funded numerous studies 
on the legal and ethical implications of genome research, none of 
these studies approaches the issue from an international or su-
pranational perspective. 
Second, the Europeans have placed their analysis within the 
broader framework of international human rights law. After 
almost a decade of study, the Council of Europe's Committee of 
Ministers recently adopted the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to 
the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine ("Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine").6 The recommendations from the European Parlia-
mentary Assembly, the resolutions and studies emanating from 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, and the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine all share a com-
mon legal perspective: the protection of fundamental human 
rights. The United States commentary, by comparison, has fo-
cused on dissecting the issues and compartmentalizing them 
along traditional lines of legal theory within existing United 
States legal paradigms. This compartmentalization means that 
there is no single legal theory in the United States that ties 
together disparate pieces of legislation addressing the legal prob-
lems raised by genetic research. 
This Article, then, examines these similarities and differences 
in approach. Part I explains the science behind the Human Ge-
European Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, 
established by the European Convention, oversee the implementation and interpretation 
of the European Convention. Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention eliminates the 
Commission and collapses this two-tier system into a single Court of Human Rights. 
Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, May 11, 1994, 
Europ. T.S. No. 155, 33 I.L.M. 943. 
" Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine, Directorate of Legal Affairs, DIR/JUR (96) 14, opened for signature 
April 4, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 817 ["Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine"]. 
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nome Project in order to provide the reader with an understand-
ing of the probabilistic nature of the information provided by 
genome research. Part II proVides a brief history of the inte~­
national effort to map and sequence the human genome. Part III 
briefly discusses the limitations of the science and the impact of 
those limitations on public policymaking and legislative 
decisionmaking. Part IV compares key provisions of the Council 
of Europe's Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine with 
existing (and some proposed) U.S. legislation, and discusses how 
each system addresses employers' and insurers' use of genetic 
information. 
I. WHAT IS THE HUMAN GENOME?7 
An even more basic question is: what is a genome? A genome 
is an organism's entire genetic material. All living organisms 
contain genetic material or genomes. 8 
The question for scientists is how genetic information is trans-
mitted from generation to generation. In order to unravel that 
mystery, scientists must understand how the human genome is 
configured. That process requires an examination of human cells 
at the molecular level, moving from the specific-the genes-to 
the general-the chromosomes. 
The starting point is deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA. DNA 
provides the code for producing the proteins responsible for the 
inheritance of human characteristics or genetic traits. DNA con-
sists of two extremely long strands of nucleotides twisted around 
each other in what is known as a "double helix". A nucleotide 
consists of (i) one of four bases: adenine (A), guanosine (G), cyti-
dine (C), or thymidine (T); (ii) a sugar; and (iii) a phosphate. 
7 For a comprehensive discussion of the science of genetics, see generally OFFICE OF 
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 3; Dennis S. Krujala, A Legal Research Agenda for the Human 
Genome Initiative, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 121, 124-43 (1992). 
" Part of the Human Genome Project involves sequencing the genome of other or-
ganisms (e.g., yeast and E. coli) in an effort to understand the connection to human ge-
netic material. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 3, at 41-43. 
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Thus, each strand of DNA contains these bases, arranged in a 
particular order or sequence along the strand. The bases on each 
strand "pair up" with complementary bases on the opposing 
strand of the double-stranded DNA. (Adenine pairs only with 
thymidine, while guanosine pairs only with cytidine.) Every cell 
in the human body contains DNA or this double-stranded se-
quence of base pairs. Cells duplicate themselves in a complicated 
process in which the DNA "unwinds" and each strand replicates 
itself by attracting its complementary bases, i.e., A's pair with 
T's, and C's pair with G's. The final product of cell duplication is 
two sets of the double-stranded DNA, one for each cell. 
A gene is a portion of the long DNA double helix that "codes 
for (directs) the production of protein products used by the or-
ganism to build up and repair its various parts, catalyze meta-
bolic processes, or even regulate the activity of other genes."9 
Thus, genes are considered the basic unit of heredity. 10 Scien-
tists estimate that the average gene consists of 1,000 base 
pairs. 11 Because human beings have anywhere from 50,000 to 
100,000 genes, scientists estimate that the human genome con-
sists of approximately three billion base pairs. 12 The unusual 
thing about the human genome, however, is that there are no 
genes along vast areas of the DNA.13 Some scientists call these 
areas of DNA on which no genes are located ''junk" DNA. Thus, 
the U.S. effort to sequence all three billion base pairs means that 
scientists may be sequencing vast areas of the human genome on 
which no genes, or areas that code for genetic inheritance, exist. 14 
9 Karjala, supra note 7, at 129. 
10 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 3, at 41-43. 
11 Karjala, supra note 7, at 129. 
12 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 3, Table 2.2 at 25; Karjala, supra note 7, at 
129. 
'' A high resolution map of the X chromosome, recently completed by a team of biolo-
gists at Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis, confirms "that the genes 
are arranged [along the chromosome] in a clumpy way, with lengthy, apparently desert 
regions of DNA in between .... " Nicholas Wade, Research Team Takes Big Stride in 
Human-Gene Mapping, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1997, at A1, A10. Scientists estimate that 
genes account for only 3% of the total DNA in human cells. John Galloway, Britain and 
the Human Genome, NEW Sci., July 28, 1990, at 41, 42. 
•• The presence of "junk" DNA has spawned a debate in the scientific community 
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The genes are arranged within the cells along rod-like sctruc-
tures called chromosomes. The somatic or nonreproductive cells 
of the body contain 23 pairs of, or 46, chromosomes. The repro-
ductive cells, i.e., the ovum and sperm, contain only one set of, or 
23, chromosomes. Genetic diversity occurs, in part, because dur-
ing sexual reproduction, each parent contributes one set of, or 
23, chromosomes. Thus, the offspring from a human sexual un-
ion has one set of chromosomes from the mother and one set of 
chromosomes from the father. 
II. WHAT IS THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT? 
A. International Collaboration 
The Human Genome Project is an international research pro-
ject, whose goal, simply stated, is to identify the location of the 
50,000 to 100,000 human genes that code for various human 
genetic traits by mapping and sequencing the en~ire human 
genome. By doing so, scientists hope to identify those genes re-
sponsible for disease, determine how those genes trigger disease, 
and, thus, intervene to delay, and ultimately avoid, the onset of 
disease. 
The basic concept underlying the Human Genome Pro-
ject-identifying genes that code for disease in an effort to pre-
dict and eradicate disease-is not new. For example, for decades 
scientists have studied family histories, following genetic traits 
through generations. By doing so and noting how often particu-
lar genetic traits appear with other genetic traits, scientists can 
construct crude maps, called genetic linkage maps, indicating the 
relative location of certain genes. What distinguishes the Human 
Genome Project is not the idea of mapping genes, but the 
breadth of the mapping and sequencing endeavor. 
about the proper strategy to use in sequencing the human genome. "Some biologists want 
to sequence the entire chromosome as soon as possible, while others argue that it would 
be better to sequence the gene-rich regions first and save the gene-poor regions for later, 
wlien the cost of sequencing will be lower." Wade, supra note 13, at AlO. 
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In the mid-1980s, several people15 more or less simultaneous-
ly suggested that scientists undertake a comprehensive mapping 
and sequencing of the human genome. 16 While intriguing to 
many, the idea of mapping and sequencing the human genome 
raised concerns among some scientists about the proper alloca-
tion of scarce scientific resources. Some questioned the wisdom of 
devoting the huge resources necessary to conduct such a compre-
hensive scientific endeavor. Questions and concerns about such a 
massive scientific endeavor spawned workshops, meetings, and 
studies. 17 By the late 1980s, the Department of Energy (DOE) 
and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) emerged as the two 
federal government agencies spearheading the efforts within the 
United States to study the human genome.18 In 1989, the De-
partment of Health and Human Services created the National 
Center for Human Genome Research (NCHGR), which is respon-
sible for coordinating genome research efforts within the NIH. 19 
By 1990, the DOE and NIH had formalized and published a joint 
research project, which delineated major goals for the Human 
Genome Project within the United States for the years 1990 
through 1995.20 The NCHGR revised those goals in its most 
" They were (i) Robert Sinsheimer, who was Chancellor of the University of Califor-
nia at Santa Cruz, (ii) Charles DeLisi, who later took over at the Department of Energy's 
Office of Health and Environmental Research, and (iii) Renato Dulbecco, winner of the 
Nobel Prize in molecular biology and head of the Italian Genome Project. See Robert 
Mullan Cook-Deegan, Origins of the Human Genome Project, 5 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & 
ENV'T 97, 102 (1994). 
16 For a succinct history of the origins of the Human Genome Project, see id. at 97-
113. 
17 Id. at 102-108. 
'" The Department of Energy received an allocation of $5.5 million for human ge-
nome research in 1987; Congress appropriated $10.7 million and $17.2 million, respec-
tively, to the Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health for human 
genome research in 1988. For Congressional appropriations through fiscal year 1993, see 
id. at 109. 
'" James Watson, one of the two scientists responsible for discovering DNA, original-
ly oversaw the National Center for Human Genome Research (NCHGR). Currently, Fran-
cis Collins, formerly of the University of Michigan Medical School, heads the NCHGR. 
The NCHGR publishes progress reports, which are available free to the public by contact-
"ing the NCHGR's Office of Communications at (302) 402-0911. 
20 See generally UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, UNDERSTANDING OUR GENETIC INHERITANCE. 
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recent report, setting forth a "new five-year plan" for the years 
1994 through 1998, which took account of the progress made and 
setbacks encountered during the first four years of the Human 
Genome Project.21 
The United States, however, is not the only country engaged in 
human genome research. In fact, what distinguishes the Human 
Genome Project, besides the scope of its goals, is its international 
character. A number of other countries are also engaged in map-
ping and sequencing the human genome.22 The United Kingdom 
has established the Human Genome Mapping Project Resource 
Center (HGMP). Because the genome effort within the United 
Kingdom is smaller and less well-financed than that in the Unit-
ed States, the HGMP intends to study only those areas of the 
genome on which genes are located.23 In Italy, the Italian Na-
tional Research Council provided funding, starting in 1987, for a 
collaborative effort among numerous Italian universities to map 
a portion of the X chromosome.24 Only recently, French re-
searchers published the final version of the Human Genetic Map, 
which identified genetic markers along the human genome ap-
proximately every 700,000 base pairs. Jean Weissenbach coordi-
nated the team of researchers at Genethon I, which produced the 
Human Genetic Map. Started in 1990, Genethon I is a collabo-
ration between the Association Francaise contre les Myopathles 
(the equivalent of the Muscular Dystrophy Association in the 
United States) and the Centre d'Etude du Polymorphisme 
Humain, run by Jean Dausset in Paris. 
THE U.S. HUMAN GENO:ME PROJECT: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS (1990). 
21 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF 
HEALTH, THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HUMAN GENO:ME RE-
SEARCH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH: FISCAL YEARS 1993-1994, Table 1 at 6. 
22 See Renato Dulbecco, The Italian Genome Project, 7 GENOMICS 294 (1990); M.A. 
Ferguson-Smith, European Approach to the Human Gene Project, 5 FASEB 61 (1991); Yoji 
Ikawa, Human Genome Efforts in Japan, 5 FASEB 66 (1991); Robert Mullan Cook-
Deegan, supra note 15, at 109-112; Leslie Roberts, Carving Up the Human Genome, 242 
SCI. 1244 (1988); James Watson & Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, The Human Genome 
Project and International Health, 263 JAMA 3322 (1990). See also generally Galloway, 
supra note 13. · 
"'
1 See Galloway, supra note 13, at 41-42. 
24 Dulbecco, supra note 22, at 294; Ferguson-Smith, supra note 22, at 63. 
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Scientific coordination has occurred across national lines. The 
European Community created the Human Genome Analysis 
Program and allocated funds for the study of the human genome 
and the ethical and legal implications raised by genetic re-
search.25 Out of a 1988 meeting on genome research held in 
Cold Spring Harbor, New York, emerged the Human Genome 
Organization (HUGO). HUGO's goal is to foster collaboration 
across national borders on scientific work on the human ge-
nome.26 Recent evidence of this scientific cooperation across 
national boundaries came with the announcement that an in-
ternational team of scientists completed DNA sequencing of the 
6,000 genes that comprise the yeast genome. Scientists hailed 
this as a significant advance in the mapping and sequencing of 
the human genome because nearly one-third of the genes of the 
yeast genome are akin to genes within the human genome. In 
addition, the completion of the yeast genome sequence demon-
strated the advantages of international collaboration: ninety-two 
laboratories located within European Union nations, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and Japan worked to produce the final se-
quenced yeast genome. 27 
B. Mapping, Sequencing, and Gene Identification 
The ultimate goal of genetic research is the curing of disease. 
In order to do so, however, scientists must determine the loca-
tion of genes responsible for disease and ascertain how those 
genes function. The Human Genome Project established the 
following goals toward achievement of this end: (i) constructing 
genetic linkage and physical maps of the genome; (ii) sequencing 
the 3 billion base pairs that comprise the human genome; and 
(iii) determining the location of the 50,000 to 100,000 genes of 
the human genome.28 
'-' Ferguson-Smith, supra note 22, at 64. 
26 Id. at 61. 
27 See generally FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE FINAL DEPARTMENT AND 
AGENCY DOCUMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, INTERNATIONAL 
TEAM COMPLETES DNA SEQUENCE OF YEAST (1996). 
'" NATIONAL CENTER FOR HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF 
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1. Mapping 
The first step in genome research is mapping. The goal of 
mapping is to identify certain genetic markers or landmarks 
along each of the chromosomes. Imagine a map of the United 
States. This map shows the locations of cities, towns, lakes, 
mountains, roads, etc. Similarly, the genetic map provides infor-
mation to scientists about the relative location of genes on the 46 
human chromosomes. Just as a map of the United States can be 
more or less specific, so are maps of the human genome. There 
are various mapping techniques of different levels of resolu-
tion.29 Understanding the difference between genetic linkage 
and physical mapping is not critical to comprehending the basic 
idea behind mapping. Essentially, mapping techniques allow 
scientists, with differing levels of specificity, to ascertain the 
general "neighborhood" in which particular genes "reside" on the 
chromosomes. Physical maps offer the possibility of greater reso-
lution or specificity than do genetic linkage maps. By mapping, 
scientists then can zero in and begin the more trying and time-
consuming task of sequencing. 
HEALTH, supra note 21, Table 1 at 6. 
29 Mapping techniques fall generally into two categories: genetic linkage maps and 
physical maps. The original five-year goals of the Human Genome Project with regard to 
genetic linkage and physical mapping called for a genetic linkage map with genetic mark-
ers located every two to five million base pairs and a physical map of genetic markers 
located every 100,000 base pairs. !d., Appendix I at 60. Scientists reached the genetic 
linkage map goal ahead of schedule with a map of genetic markers located a mere 
700,000 base pairs apart. Id. at 8. Scientists expect to complete the physical map, which 
is behind schedule, by 1997. See Charles Craig, Human Genome Project Launches Final 
Phase with $18M, BIOWORLD TODAY, April 11, 1996; see also NATIONAL CENTER FOR 
HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 21, at 12-15. 
For a more detailed explanation of genetic linkage and physical mapping techniques, see 
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 3, at 26-40. 
A group of researchers at Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis re-
cently completed a high-resolution map of the X chromosome with genetic markers locat-
ed every 75,000 base pairs. The level of detail of the map is analogous to having "a road 
map ... [of] a 2,100-mile highway ... [with] an identifying marker every mile." Wade, 
supra note 13, at A1, AS. 
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2. Sequencing 
Sequencing is the process by which scientists determine the 
order of the nucleotides that comprise the double-stranded DNA. 
Because there are 3 billion base pairs of nucleotides that com-
prise the entire human genome, sequencing is a monumental 
endeavor. The Human Genome Project in the United States 
recently began sequencing the human genome. The Project allo-
cated $18 million for a one-year pilot program, involving six 
research universities, to commence nucleotide sequencing. It is 
expected that another $60 million will be allocated for the follow-
ing three years to continue the sequencing efforts. Francis Col-
lins, the Director .of the NCHGR, estimates that sequencing will 
be complete by the year 2003.30 
3. Gene Identification 
Mapping and sequencing allow scientists to identify genes. 
Because genes code for genetic traits and inheritance, identifying 
genes responsible for causing disease remains a high priority of 
genetic research.31 But identifying genes responsible for disease 
does not mean that scientists know how that gene's functioning 
causes disease. "Progress to date indicates that the ability to 
diagnose a genetic abnormality precedes the development of 
therapeutic interventions and that this gap may be growing. 
This is true for many genetic diseases, an important example 
being Huntington's disease."32 Thus, while the accomplishments 
of the Human Genome Project indeed are extraordinary, 
policymakers should be aware of the limitations of the scientific 
knowledge acquired. Those scientific limitations necessarily may 
·•• See Craig, supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
11 Scientists have been successful in locating the genes responsible for numerous ge-
netic diseases and anomalies. See, e.g., NATiONAL CENTER FOR HUMAN GENOME RE-
SEARCH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 21, Tables 4, 5 at 28-29; Sandra 
Blakeslee, Researchers Track Down a Gene That May Govern Spatial Abilities, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 23, 1996, at C3; Robert Langreth, Scientists Find Proof that Mutant Gene 
Can Increase the Risk of Prostate Cancer, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1996, at B2. 
12 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 3, at 83 (citation omitted). 
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shape public and legislative policy with regard to access, use, 
and disclosure of genetic information. 
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE 
The pace of scientific discovery in the field of genetics is truly 
astounding. Less than half a century ago, James Watson and 
Francis Crick "discovered" the building block of human inheri-
tance, DNA.33 Today, scientists are experimenting with somatic 
cell gene therapt4 in an effort to heal patients afflicted with 
arthritis and arterial blockage. 35 But scientific discoveries 
spawned by the Human Genome Project are not a cure-all. Scien-
tific knowledge acquired from the Human Genome Project is 
limited, and decisions made by public policymakers and legisla-
tors in the decades to come will be shaped by these limitations. 
Some of the limitations on scientific knowledge obtained by the 
Human Genome Project include genetic penetrance, polygenic 
disorders, and multifactorial diseases. 
A. Genetic Penetrance 
Two persons with the same gene may manifest the trait for 
which the gene codes to different degrees. This is penetrance. 
Thus, even if an individual carries a genetic marker for a specific 
gene, the presence of the marker does not necessarily provide 
"" James Watson and Francis Crick made the discovery in 1953. See generally JAMES 
WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX (1968). 
:w Human gene therapy is the "[i]nsertion of normal DNA directly into cells to correct 
a genetic defect." OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 3, Appendix Gat 202. All cells in 
the human body, except for the human reproductive cells, e.g., ovum and sperm cells, are 
somatic cells. Human reproductive cells are called germ cells. Somatic cell gene therapy 
is less controversial than germ line therapy because the changes in somatic cells affect 
only the individual treated. Changes in germ lines affect future generations. Id. 
The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine bans germ-line therapy and 
accepts only a limited role for somatic cell therapy. See Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, supra note 6, art. 13. 
35 See Gina Kolata, Gene Therapy Shows First Signs of Bypassing Arterial Blockage, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1996, at C3; Warren E. Leary, Arthritis Researchers Try Gene Ther-
apy: First Use of New Technique for Disease That Isn't Life-Threatening, N.Y. TIMES, July 
18, 1996, at A16. 
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information about when the disease will manifest itself or the 
severity of symptoms the individual will display. Certain disor-
ders and genetic traits have wide ranges of penetrance. For ex-
ample, some persons affiicted with multiple sclerosis have rela-
tively mild symptoms, while for others the disease is dis-
abling.36 
B. Polygenic Disorders 
Having the ability to test for particular genetic markers also 
fails to account for the reality of genetic inheritance: single or 
monogenic genetic disorders are the exception, not the rule. 
Monogenic disorders, such as Huntington's Disease, prob-
ably serve as the genetic model for most laypersons. The 
notion is that if you have a particular gene, you will end up 
with the associated phenotypic37 trait. In fact, it appears 
that monogenic disorders are rare and that the most com-
mon genetic disorders are multigenic, in that they involve 
the interaction of many genes, often genes on different 
chromosomes ... It is therefore important that the monogen-
ic model, as important as it may be for some rare diseases, 
should not be the model on which the development of gener-
al social policy is based. 38 
Thus, testing only for the presence of one gene may erroneously 
suggest that an individual will develop a particular genetic disor-
der when manifestation of the disorder actually requires muta-
tions along at least two, if not more, genes. 39 Given the cost as-
sociated with massive screening for a singular genetic marker, 
the benefits of screening for polygenic disorders, which would 
'" See infra note 40 for discussion of chronic beryllium disease. 
·" Phenotype is an individual's physical manifestation of genetic traits. See Karjala, 
supra note 7, at 136-37. 
" ld. at 146. 
"" See generally Eric S. Lander & Nicholas J. Schork, Genetic Dissection of Complex 
Traits, 265 SCI. 2037, 2038 (1994) ("Polygenic inheritance. Some traits may require the si-
multaneous presence of mutations in multiple genes."). 
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require identification of several genes on different chromosomes, 
are not likely to justify the expense. 
C. Multifactorial Disorders 
Although some commentators use the term "multifactorial" 
interchangeably with "polygenic," I prefer to use the term "multi-
factorial" to refer to disorders having both genetic and environ-
mental influences. For example, many people possess a genetic 
predisposition to heart disease. Environmental or lifestyle factors 
(e.g., smoking, exercise, and diet) affect the likelihood of suffer-
ing a heart attack. Perhaps even more important from an 
employer's perspective are those diseases, such as chronic beryl-
lium disease or CBD,40 triggered in employees with genetic sus-
ceptibility to chemicals or other agents used in the workplace. 
Further complicating the issue is the possibility that a given 
genetic disorder may be both polygenic and multifactorial. -
Genetic disorders belie simple classification. Genetic informa-
tion is, by its nature, probabilistic and inexact. Therefore, testing 
for the presence of single genetic mutations may often lead to 
inaccurate conclusions about the future medical profile of the 
person tested. The presence of a genetic marker does not mean 
that the individual tested will definitely develop symptoms of a 
genetic disorder. Manifestation of disease may depend on the 
following factors: (i) mutations of several genes; (ii) the presence 
•• Chronic beryllium disease (CBD) causes irreversible scarring of the tissues in the 
lungs, affecting an individual's ability to breathe. Only a small percentage of the popu-
lation (between 1% and 5%) is acutely sensitive to beryllium, a metal used to produce 
industrial components. Even though a genetic link has been established, the mechanism 
by which certain persons become ill with CBD while others with the same genetic predis-
position are unaffected remains a mystery. For example, a study of workers exposed to 
beryllium found that 34 out of 35 workers who developed CBD shared the same genetic 
marker; however, one out of three workers who did not develop CBD also shared the 
same marker. See Barry Meier, The Dark Side of a Magical Metal: BeryUium Disease 
Reappears, Prompting Suits Against a Producer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, at Cl. 
A number of other diseases and disorders with a genetic component are triggered by 
exposure to particular environmental agents. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, 
UNITED STATES CONGRESS, GENETIC MONITORING AND SCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE, 
Table 1-1 at 13 (1990) ["GENETIC MONITORING"]. 
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of certain environmental triggers; (iii) mutations of more than 
one gene coupled with environmental triggers; and/or (iv) the 
degree of penetrance of the gene. Just as modern genetics is 
"driven by [the] inconvenient reality [that] [m]ost traits of medi-
cal relevance do not follow simple Mendelian monogenic inheri-
tance,"41 so must the shaping of public policy be driven by an 
understanding of the probabilistic nature of genetic inheritance 
and the limitations of genetic knowledge. 
IV. EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES-A COMPARISON OF 
LEGAL APPROACHES 
Scientific research on the human genome implicates a broad 
spectrum of legal issues,42 ranging from the impact on the indi-
vidual, e.g., access to and uses of genetic testing devices by indi-
viduals and third parties, such as employers and insurers, to the 
implications for the species, e.g., the wisdom of germ-line thera-
PY and cloning.43 An effort to differentiate legal approaches 
across national boundaries may suffer, at times, from a desire to 
prove too much. Common themes emerge upon examination of 
the legal and regulatory efforts in Europe and in the United 
States.44 In terms of enacting \!omprehensive federal or national 
legislation dealing with the use of genetic information by em-
ployers and insurers, individual European nations are not neces-
" Lander & Schork, supra note 39, at 2037. 
42 See generally Karjala, supra note 7, at 147-220. 
43 See Building to Order, ECONOMIST, March 1-7, 1997, at 81; Gina Kolata, With 
Cloning of a Sheep, the Ethical Ground Shifts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1997, at A1, BS. 
44 Two commentators argue that five fundamental principles underlie national efforts 
to regulate genetic research: (i) autonomy, (ii) privacy, (iii) justice, (iv) equity, and (v) 
quality. See generally Bartha Maria Knoppers & Ruth Chadwick, The Human Genome 
Project: Under an International Ethical Microscope, 265 SCI. 2035 (1994). 
In their study of the attitudes of medical geneticists across the globe, John Fletcher 
and Dorothy Wertz discovered a broad consensus in approaches to particular ethical di-
lemmas posed by the availability of genetic testing. From the results of this international 
survey, Fletcher and Wertz propose the basis for an international code of ethics for medi-
cal geneticists, based on a foundation of eight ethical guidelines. See John C. Fletcher & 
Dorothy C. Wertz, An International Code of Ethics in Medical Genetics Before the Human 
Genome is Mapped, GENETICS, ETHICS, AND HUMAN VALUES, PROC. XXIVTH CIOMS 
CONF. 97, 111-15 (1990). 
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sarily any farther along than the United States.45 Nonetheless, 
one important difference distinguishes the European and Ameri-
can approaches toward evaluating the legal implications of hu-
man genome research: the Europeans address the legal issues 
implicated by such research within the framework of suprana-
tional human rights law. 
A. The Supranational Human Rights Framework: Europe 
Since the middle of the 1980s, national governments in Europe 
have been engaged in a supranational study of the human im-
pact of biological and medical research.46 This early work laid 
the foundation for the Council of Europe's comprehensive study 
of the legal and ethical implications of genetic research, which, 
in turn, led to the adoption, on November 19, 1996, by the Coun-
cil of Europe's Committee of Ministers of the Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine. 
The long process that culminated in opening the Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine for signature by the member 
states of the Council of Europe began in early June of 1990 at 
the 17th Conference of the European Ministers of Justice. At 
that time, the European Ministers of Justice adopted a resolu-
tion recommending the development of a "framework" bioethics 
convention.47 A year later, the Parliamentary Assembly, in Rec-
ommendation 1160, called upon the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe to draft a human rights convention specifi-
•• A few European nations have enacted legislation dealing with certain implications 
of human genetic research. See, e.g., Knoppers & Chadwick, supra note 44, at 2035 nn.39-
47; Noelle LeNoir, French, European, and International Legislation on Bioethics, 27 SUF-
FOLK U. L. REV. 1249 (1993). . 
•s See GENETIC TESTING AND SCREENING FOR HEALTH CARE PuRPOSES, COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE, COMM. OF MINISTERS (1993); EUR. PARL. Ass. REC. 1160 (June 28, 1991), reprint-
ed in ROGERS & DE BOUSINGEN, supra note 2, at 320; EUR. PARL. Ass. REC. 1100 (Feb. 2, 
1989), reprinted in ROGERS & DE BOUSINGEN, supra note 2, at 311 (1995); EUR. PARL. 
Ass. REC. 1046 (Sept. 24, 1986), reprinted in ROGERS AND DE BOUSINGEN, supra note 2, at 
306; CHRISTIAN BYK, MEDICAL AND BIOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND THE EUROPEAN CONVEN-
TION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1994). 
•
7 See Explanatory Report, supra note 4, 'll 4 at 4. 
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cally tailored to the impact of biological and medical research. 
Recommendation 1160 provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 
1. The combined applications of biology, biochemistry and 
medicine, create universal problems which require solutions 
and have given rise to a new discipline called bioethics. The 
hopes raised by progress in this domain are sometimes 
tempered by anxiety over the most basic rights of the human 
person .... 
4. The Assembly considers that, despite some disparities 
which still exist in national approaches and the wide range 
of aspects to consider, the moment seems ripe and timely 
for joint European action such as the preparation of a legal 
instrument in order to codify existing work, which is valu-
able but fragmented .... 
7. The Assembly therefore recommends that the Committee 
of Ministers: 
i. envisage a framework convention comprising a 
main text with general principles and additional 
protocols on specific aspects. . . . [The convention] 
must include human rights aspects and take into 
account the previous work of the Council of Eu-
rope.48 
The Council of Europe's Steering Committee on Bioethics 
(CDB1)49 established a Working Party in March of 1992 to draft 
a convention. More than two years later, the CDBI submitted the 
Draft Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Digni-
ty of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology 
and Medicine: Bioethics Convention ("Draft Convention")50 to 
•• EUR. PARL. Ass. REC. 1160 (June 28, 1991), reprinted in ROGERS & DE BOUSINGEN, 
supra note 2, at 320-31 (emphasis added). 
49 The Steering Committee on Bioethics originally was named the Committee of 
Experts on Bioethics (CAHBl). Explanatory Report, supra note 4, 'li 1 at 4. 
'" Draft Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human 
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the Parliamentary Assembly. In February of 1995, the Parlia-
mentary Assembly issued Opinion No. 184 recommending certain 
amendments t~ the Draft Convention prior to its adoption by the 
Committee of Ministers. 51 In June of 1996, the CDBI submitted 
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine to the Parlia-
mentary Assembly for its opinion.52 Five months later, the Com-
mittee of Ministers adopted the Convention, which was to be 
opened for signature on April4, 1997.53 
As its name suggests, the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine fits within the broader framework of human rights 
law. The Preamble to the Convention provides that the member 
states and signatory nations, in acceding to the Convention,, bear 
in mind the relevance of not only The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,54 but also several earlier conventions by the 
Council of Europe, including the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 55 
The term "human rights" refers to the principles laid down 
in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950, which guaran-
tee protection of such rights. The two Conventions share 
not only the same underlying approach but also many ethi-
cal principles and legal concepts.56 
Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Bioethics Convention, 
reprinted in ROGERS & DE BOUSINGEN, supra note 2, at 247-260 [hereinafter Draft Con-
vention] (copy on file with author). 
51 EUR. PARL. Ass. OP. No. 184, Doc. No. 7210 (Feb. 2, 1995), reprinted in ROGERS & 
DE BOUSINGEN, supra note 2, at 291-296. 
"
2 EUR. PARL. Ass. OP. No. 198, Doc. No. 7622 (Sept. 26, 1996). 
"' The Committee of Ministers adopted the Convention on Human Rights and Bio-
medicine on November 19, 1996. Three member states of the Council of Eu-
rope-Belgium, Germany, and Poland-abstained from the vote. 
"' The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 3d Sess., in HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 1 (1988). 
"-' Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
56 Explanatory Report, supra note 4, 'II 9 at 6. 
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Thus, the European Court of Human Rights'57 interpretation of 
the term "human rights" in case law spanning over four decades 
provides a legal framework for understanding the Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine. 
The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, however, 
is more than simply a legal document. The human rights work of 
the Council of Europe is rooted in a particular philosophical 
tradition and is shaped, in varying parts, by natural rights phi-
losophy and the Rawlsian theory of justice. 58 As the heir to this 
philosophical tradition, the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine contains two overriding themes: the concept of hu-
man dignity and the primacy of the individual. 
The concept of human dignity is rooted in natural rights phi-
losophy and has shaped modern human rights doctrine. 59 As 
one commentator notes, the "choice of human dignity as the 
'super-value' in the shaping and sharing of all other values has a 
natural right ring to it."60 This concept of human dignity is a 
core value of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. 
The Explanatory Report states that human dignity is "the essen-
tial value to be upheld" and "the basis of most of the values 
emphasised in the Convention."61 Its role as a core value is evi-
denced by its inclusion in the first article of the Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine, which states, in pertinent part, 
" Article 29 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine gives the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights the authority to provide "advisory opinions on legal questions 
concerning the interpretation of the [ ] Convention at the request of' the government of a 
party to the Convention, or at the request of the CDBI. Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, supra note 6, art. 29. 
"" Jerome J. Shestack, The Jurisprudence of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 69, 85-88, 90-94 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984); see JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
•q "The doctrine of human rights that predominantly influenced the writings of the 
Universal Declaration is found in the western European interpretation of human rights 
as an evolved concept in the natural law tradition .... [P]rior to the use of the term 
human rights, such rights were typically called the rights of man or natural rights." THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 9 (Alan 8. Rosenbaum ed., 
1980). 
"" Shestack, supra note 58, at 96 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
"' Explanatory Report, supra note 4, 'li 9 at 6. 
1997] REGULATING GENETIC DESTINY 385 
that the "[p]art;ies to this Convention shall protect the dignity 
and identity of all human beings .... "62 
The primacy of the individual is the second key theme of the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Article 2 of the 
Convention states that "[t]he interests and welfare of the human 
being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science."63 
Thus, neither economic efficiency nor scientific progress may 
justify the use of genetic information that proves detrimental to 
the interests of the individual. The "temptation may be great to 
abandon certain basic principles on the pretence of efficiency. 
The dignity of the human being dictates that certain principles 
will not admit of any exception."64 Similarly, Rawls' theory of 
justice accords primary position to certain fundamental princi-
ples and relegates economic efficiency to a secondary position. 65 
The twin themes of human dignity and primacy of the human 
being shed some light on how to interpret the Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine. The term ''human dignity" cer-
tainly is not one capable of easy definition. For example, when a 
conflict arises between the interests of third parties, whether 
they be scientific researchers or employers, and the individual, 
the Convention indicates that the rights of the individual should 
prevail: 
[Article 2] affirms the primacy of the human being over the 
sole interest of science or society. Priority is given to the 
former, which must in principle take precedence over the 
latter in the event of a conflict between them. . . . The 
whole Convention, the aim of which is to protect human 
rights and dignity, is inspired by the principle of the prima-
"
1 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 6, art. 1 (emphasis 
added). 
"" Id., art. 2. 
64 ROGERS & DE BOUSINGEN, supra note 2, at 13 . 
.. , "[l]n justice as fairness the principles of justice are prior to considerations of effi-
ciency .... " RAWLS, supra note 58, at 69. 
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cy of the human being, and all its articles must be inter-
preted in this light.66 
By placing the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
within the broader context of supranational human rights law, 
the drafters supplied a legal and philosophical tradition which 
can be used to interpret the necessarily broad (and sometimes 
vague) language of the Convention. 
B. The U.S. Approach 
By comparison, the United States has focused its legal and 
ethical studies on the national level. Both the NCHGR and the 
DOE allocate 3% of their human genome budget to research into 
the ethical, legal, and social implications of the Human Genome 
Project within the United States. In addition, the NIH and DOE 
created a Joint Working Group on Ethical, Legal, and Social 
Implications of Human Genome Research (ELSI). ELSI provides 
grant money for research projects, ranging from genetic educa-
tion efforts to studies of existing legal protections in the United 
States for genetic information. 67 To date, ELSI has funded no 
international comparative studies of the legal implications of 
genetic research, and the United States government has not been 
at the forefront of any efforts to frame an international docu-
ment that establishes fundamental legal principles governing 
genetic research. 
Part of this difference in approach stems from geographical 
constraints. As a North American country, the United States 
may not join the Council of Europe. For most of the Council of 
Europe's history, nonmember states could not even sign the 
Council's conventions. But this does not preclude the United 
States, which is a member state of the Organization of American 
States (OAS), the American counterpart to the Council of Eu-
66 Explanatory Report, supra note 4, 'll'll 21-22, at 8. 
"' See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF 
HEALTH, supra note 21, at 44-51. 
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rope, from playing an important role in drafting an inter-Ameri-
can Biomedicine Convention. Economic realities may well ac-
count for the absence of an inter-American effort to study the 
legal and ethical implications of the Human Genome Project. 
Vast differences in economic achievement and stability exist 
between most member states of the OAS and those of the Coun-
cil of Europe. 68 The legal and ethical implications of genetic re-
search are perhaps less pressing in most OAS member states, 
which lack formalized human genome research projects, unlike 
those existing in several European nations. 
Nothing now precludes the United States from establishing 
closer ties with the Council of Europe. In fact, the Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine specifically provides that it is 
open for signature by "the nonmember States which have partici-
pated in its elaboration."69 Nonetheless, the United States did 
not avail itself of this opportunity, even though the international 
scientific collaboration on mapping and sequencing the human 
genome provided a rare chance to collaborate on transnational 
legal and ethical issues. 
The United States, however, must be willing to collaborate 
with the Council of Europe. History paints a different picture. 
One commentator noted that the United States ''has a history of 
rebuffing Council initiatives for closer collaboration."70 Another 
commentator, more hopeful of a change in U.S. relations, noted 
that although "American involvement in Council of Europe activ-
ities has ... been sporadic at best, and certainly not a high pri-
ority[,]"71 part of the problem has stemmed from the inability of 
the United States to join the Council of Europe, and, for most of 
"" See A. GLENN MOWER, JR., REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
THE WEST EUROPEAN AND INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEMS 5-8 (1991). 
69 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 6, art. 33, 'li 1. The 
Draft Convention contained an identical provision. See Draft Convention, supra note 50, 
art. 27, 'li 1. 
70 Michael R. Lucas, Churchill's Legacy and the Need for a New US Policy, in SECUR-
ING THE EURO-ATLANTIC BRIDGE: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 53, 
62 (John Edwin Mrox et al. eds., 1993). 
71 Pinto, supra note 5, at 72-73. 
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the Council's existence, to become a signatory to Council of Eu-
rope conventions. 
Part of the difference in approach between Europe and the 
United States no doubt stems from a historical reluctance on the 
part of the United States to ratify, or accede to, international 
human rights treaties. More than three decades ago, at the Sec-
ond International Conference on the European Convention on 
Human Rights held in October of 1965, Jean-Flavien LaLive, a 
former member of the International Commission of Jurists, com-
pared the OAS's lack of progress with the success of the Council 
of Europe in achieving human rights goals. LaLive ascribed that 
failure more to the presence of the United States in the endeavor 
than to the political instability of many of the member States of 
the OAS. 
Probably the true reason for this regrettable stagnation is 
to be sought not so much in the political instability of some 
States in that region . . . [,] as in the mistake of having 
associated the United States in this effort. For the United 
States is showing infinite caution in this field. In the same 
way as they virtually deprived their acceptance of the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice of 
all real substance (by the Connally Amendment), so too, but 
more frankly, they have indicated that they have no inten-
tion of participating in conventions on human rights, and to 
this end have invoked certain constitutional bars and the 
federal structure of the Government. 72 
Almost two decades later, Louis Henkin, a Columbia University 
professor, attributed the failure of the United States to accede to 
the major international human rights conventions to a combina-
tion of ideological factors and moral arrogance. 
12 Jean-Fiavien LaLive, The Protection of Human Rights within the Framework of 
Existing Regional Organisations, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 330, 336 (A.H. Robertson ed., 1970). 
Q 
1997] REGULATING GENETIC DESTINY 
[R]esistance to United States adherence remains 
strong . . . . Contemporary international human rights, 
while espousing popular sovereignty, do not imply any 
particular system of government .... Many Americans be-
lieve that societies that are not democratic violate the basic 
human right on which all others depend; they are reluctant 
to adhere to an agreement which reflects a conception of 
human rights that does not include that commitment to 
authentic political democracy. 
But the resistance is deeper . . . . A deep isolationism 
continues to motivate many Americans, even some who are 
eager to judge others and to intercede on behalf of human 
rights in other countries .... The United States has noth-
ing to learn, and does not need scrutiny from others, surely 
not from the many countries where human rights fare so 
badly.73 
389 
The United States has failed to ratifY several important interna-
tional human rights treaties. For example, despite its OAS mem-
bership, the United States has signed, but neither ratified nor 
acceded to, the American Convention on Human Rights. Like-
wise, the United States, though a member of the United Nations, 
has not ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights, which entered into force on January 3, 
1976.74 
Simply because the United States has been reluctant in the 
past to ratifY certain international human rights treaties does 
not mean that its legal approach to genetic research is wrong. 
The Europeans needed a legal framework that transcended na-
tional paradigms. Human rights law provides that larger legal 
framework. The questions, however, are whether the legal conse-
quences of genetic research fit within a human rights framework 
and whether a human rights perspective adds meaning beyond 
7a Louis Henkin, International Human Rights and Rights in the United States, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 25, 51-52 (Theodor 
Meron ed., 1984). 
74 See id. at 50·54, nn.81 & 85. 
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that provided by national legislation rooted in civil rights, priva-
cy, or property law. I do not address these questions in this Arti-
cle, but note that at least one practical consequence flows from a 
human rights construct. Any nation that ratifies the Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine relinquishes its sovereignty, 
to some extent, over questions dealing with genetic research. For 
example, Article 30 of the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine empowers the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe to request from any Party to the Convention an explana-
tion of how that Party's domestic law satisfies the provisions of 
the Convention. 75 Framing the legal issues stemming from ge-
netic research in a human rights context, then, "international-
izes" these issues, making them issues beyond the sole compe-
tence of individual nation-states. 76 
C. The Issues: A Comparison of Legal Texts 
The employment and insurance issues implicated by research 
on the human genome fall into two broad categories: compulsory 
genetic testing by employers or insurers and requests for and use 
of otherwise available genetic information by employers or in-
surers. A comparison of legal texts and commentary within Eu-
rope and the United States reveals numerous similarities in 
approach, but also several important differences. 
75 Article 30 provides that upon "receipt of a request from the Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe any Party shall furnish an explanation of the manner in which its 
internal law ensures the effective implementation of any of the provisions of the Conven-
tion." Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 6, art. 30. The Draft 
Convention contained identical language. See Draft Convention, supra note 50, art. 25. 
76 See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and "Domestic Jurisdiction", in HUMAN RIGHTS, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 21 (Thomas Buergenthal ed., 1977). 
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1. Compulsory Genetic Testing by Employers and Insurers-
In Europe 
a. Employers 
Article 12 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedi-
cine prohibits most forms of genetic screening or monitoring77 in 
the workplace. 
Tests which are predictive of genetic diseases or which 
serve either to identify the subject as a carrier of a gene 
responsible for a disease or to detect a genetic predisposi-
tion or susceptibility to a disease may be performed only for 
health purposes or for scientific research linked to health 
purposes, and subject to appropriate genetic counselling.78 
Since the Convention does not completely ban all genetic testing, 
the proper scope of employment-based genetic testing remains an 
issue. Both the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
and its Explanatory Report make clear that genetic testing must 
play a limited role in the workplace, and that any testing done 
must be for the health of the individual employee, not for the 
commercial interests of the employer. What is not clear is wheth-
er the employer can conduct genetic testing if there are mixed 
motives for the testing, e.g., concern both for employee health 
and for the company's financial health, and whether the employ-
er may conduct genetic tests on both potential and current em-
ployees. Resolving these issues requires an examination of the 
77 There is a difference between genetic screening and genetic monitoring. 
In most cases, screening requires a one-time test to detect a single trait in a 
worker or job applicant, while monitoring generally involves multiple tests of a 
worker over time. Most importantly, in genetic screening the focus is on the 
preexisting genetic makeup that workers or job applicants bring to the job. This 
is distinct from genetic monitoring, where the focus is on changes in the genetic 
material induced from hazardous exposures at the workplace. 
GENETIC MONITORING, supra note 40, at 32. 
78 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 6, art. 12 (emphasis 
added). Article 12 retained the basic prohibition of predictive genetic tests contained in 
Article 17 of the Draft Convention. Draft Convention, supra note 50, art. 17. 
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underlying themes of the Convention, as well as the language of 
the Explanatory Report and the Convention itself. 
The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine creates a 
presumption against genetic testing performed for other than 
health-related reasons. The Explanatory Report highlights the 
drafters' concern that genetic testing outside the health care 
arena could open up the possibility of misuse of genetic informa-
tion. 
Because there is an apparent risk that use is made of 
genetic testing possibilities outside health care (for instance 
in the case of medical examination prior to an employment 
or insurance contract) it is of importance to clearly distin-
guish between health care purposes for the benefit of the 
individual on the one hand and third parties' interests, 
which may be commercial, on the other hand.79 
As a result, the Convention restricts an employer's use of genetic 
testing to situations in which the employee's genetic makeup 
puts him or her at risk to particular environmental agents used 
in the workplace. 
This means that in particular circumstances, when the 
working environment could have prejudicial consequences 
on the health of an individual because of a genetic predispo-
sition, predictive genetic testing may be offered without 
prejudice to the aim of improving working conditions.80 
The question then arises: if the employer is permitted to 
screen for genetic susceptibilities to environmental agents, may 
the employer condition an employment offer upon a "clean bill of 
genetic health"? For example, suppose a producer of beryllium 
performs pre-employment genetic testing to screen for employees 
with a genetic marker for CBD.81 The employer has mixed mo-
79 Explanatory Report, supra note 4, 'II 84 at 19. 
"" Id., 'II 85 at 19. 
"' See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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tives for the testing: it certainly does not want employees to 
become ill as a result of exposure to beryllium; but it also wants 
to limit its liability to employees at risk for CBD. May the em-
ployer assert the health of the employee as justification for con-
ditioning employment on the successful completion of a genetic 
test? The language of both the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine and the Explanatory Report, as well as the 
Convention's emphasis on the primacy of the human being, man-
date a negative response to that question. 
First, Article 12 states that genetic tests "may be performed 
only for health purposes or for scientific research linked to 
health purposes .... "82 Thus, an employer may very well have 
a mixed motive for genetic testing. But the employer's asserted 
motive must be the health of the employee. Allowing the employ-
er, and not the employee, the right to decide whether to accept a 
job that exposes the employee to adverse health consequences 
because the employee has a genetic susceptibility to certain envi-
ronmental agents creates improper incentives for employers. 
Such discretion broadens, rather than narrows, the cases in 
which employers will attempt to justify genetic testing by refer-
ence to the employee's health. 
Second, the Explanatory Report reiterates the Convention's 
emphasis on a health purpose for genetic testing. Predictive 
genetic testing should be "strictly limit[ed] [in] its applicability to 
health purposes for the individual"83 and "should be clearly 
used in the interest of the individual's health."84 Allowing an 
employer, whose workplace contains environmental agents that 
may trigger disease in those with genetic susceptibilities, to 
condition employment on successful completion of genetic testing 
places the interests of the employer above those of the potential 
employee. While the employer may be concerned about the 
employee's health, the employer is motivated primarily by finan-
... , Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 6, art. 12 (emphasis 
added). 
"' Explanatory Report, supra note 4, 'li 82 at 19. 
114 Id., 'li 85 at 19. 
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cial interests, i.e., the cost associated with an employee who may 
become ill as a result of exposure to certain chemicals in the 
workplace. 
Third, the Explanatory Report states that the employer cannot 
use genetic testing as a way to avoid improving the workplace. 
Allowing employers to screen out employees with genetic suscep-
tibilities to particular environmental agents gives employers less 
incentive to find alternatives to potentially dangerous substances 
currently used in the workplace. 
Fourth, Article 11 of the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine prohibits "[a]ny form of discrimination against a 
person on grounds of his or her genetic heritage."85 By denying 
employment to a person because of his or her genetic heritage, 
an employer runs afoul of Article 11.86 
Finally, the commentary to Article 2 states that all of the 
articles of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
must be interpreted in light of the "primacy of the human being." 
When a conflict arises between the interests of science or society 
and those of the human being, the interests of the human being 
must prevail.87 Therefore, while an employer may have a legiti-
mate economic interest in reducing the number of potential em-
ployees with genetic susceptibilities to workplace environmental 
agents, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine does 
not allow the employer to screen these employees out of the 
workplace on the basis of their genetic makeup. The potential 
employee might decide not to accept a job offer that places him 
or her at risk for disease. The Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, however, leaves that decision to the individual, not 
the employer. 
The language of the Explanatory Report, unlike the Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Biomedicine, raises one other issue. 
The Explanatory Report makes clear that an employer whose 
"" Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 6, art. 11. 
"" See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text. 
"
7 Explanatory Report, supra note 4, 'II 21 at 8. 
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workplace contains environmental agents that may trigger dis-
ease in those with genetic susceptibilities may conduct limited 
pre-employment genetic tests. Paragraph 85 of the Explanatory 
Report addresses pre-employment genetic screening, but does not 
specifically discuss genetic testing of currently employed workers. 
Nothing in the language of Article 12, however, suggests that the 
drafters of the Convention intended its scope to be limited to the 
pre-employment setting. Thus, the same analysis appears to 
apply to an employer's use of genetic testing, whether it be one-
time genetic screening of potential employees or ongoing genetic 
monitoring of current employees: an employer may use such 
tests only to protect or ensure the health of individual employ-
ees. 
b. Insurance Companies 
Article 12 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedi-
cine contains a basic, rebuttable presumption against predictive 
genetic testing. Under certain circumstances, an employer may 
be able to rebut that presumption by demonstrating a health 
purpose for the testing. Such a health purpose can be shown by 
finding that environmental agents in the workplace trigger dis-
ease in those with a genetic predisposition to them. Nonetheless, 
it requires a leap of the imagination to envision a situation in 
which an insurance company could justify genetic testing by 
arguing that such testing seeks only to advance or protect the 
health of the potential insured. The drafters of the Explanatory 
Report offer no example of a situation in which insurance compa-
ny genetic testing would be justified. They do, however, offer an 
example of genetic testing in the context of employment: 
Insofar as predictive genetic testing, in the case of em-
ployment or private insurance contracts, does not have a 
health purpose, it entails a disproportionate interference in 
the rights of the individual to privacy. An insurance compa-
ny will not be entitled to subject the conclusion or modifica-
tion of an insurance policy to the holding of a predictive 
genetic test. Nor will it be able to refuse the conclusion or 
modification of such a policy on the ground that the appli-
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cant has not submitted to a test, as the conclusion of a 
policy cannot reasonably be made conditional on the per-
formance of an illegal act. 88 
While the introductory sentence to this paragraph of the Explan-
atory Report creates an exception for genetic testing conducted 
for health purposes by employers or insurers, the next two sen-
tences are absolute prohibitions on genetic testing by insurers. 
By comparison, paragraph 85 of the Explanatory Report, which 
discusses employment-based genetic testing, is not phrased in 
absolute terms; instead, the general proscription against genetic 
testing in the workplace is qualified by the employer's purpose in 
testing.89 
Article 12, however, merely precludes insurers from condition-
ing the provision of insurance on the successful completion of 
genetic tests. It does not prevent insurers from asking about 
prior genetic test results or from asking questions about family 
medical history. This family history provides genetic information, 
albeit in a less precise form than a genetic test.90 
In order to avoid the problem of adverse selection, insurers 
would want access to information about prior genetic tests. The 
Draft Explanatory Report to the Draft Bioethics Convention 
"" ld., 'II 86 at 19. 
"" Paragraph 85 of the Explanatory Report provides, in full, as follows: 
Article 12 prohibits the carrying out of predictive tests for reasons other than 
health or health-related research, even with the assent of the person concerned. 
Therefore, it is forbidden to do predictive genetic testing as part of pre-employ-
ment medical examinations, whenever it does not serve a health purpose of the 
individual. This means that in particular circumstances, when the working 
environment could have prejudicial consequences on the health of an individual 
because of a genetic predisposition, predictive genetic testing may be offered 
without prejudice to the aim of improving working conditions. The test should 
be clearly used in the interest of the individual's health. The right not to know 
should also be respected. 
Explanatory Report, supra note 4, 'II 85 at 19 (emphasis added). 
... Family history includes genetic information, e.g., a family history of heart disease 
or breast cancer increases a person's risk of heart disease or breast cancer, respectively. 
Such information is routinely sought by physicians and included in medical histories. 
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("Draft Explanatory Report")91 briefly discussed adverse selec-
tion. 
[T]he individual who has knowledge of his or her genetic 
constitution could try to use this unduly, in particular in 
the case of private insurance contracts. It is left to national 
law, taking into account especially the notion of good faith 
and the general principle forbidding the abuse of law, to 
specifY the appropriate solutions.92 
This commentary suggests that an insurer, though restricted in 
its access to genetic information, could use laws regarding fraud 
to nullify a contract entered into by an insured who had knowl-
edge of a pre-existing genetic condition that the inswed failed to 
disclose upon request. The problem, however, is that this com-
mentary accompanies a provision that no longer appears in the 
revised Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. 93 The 
Explanatory Report to the Convention does not explain the rea-
son for its deletion. Thus, it is not clear whether the comments 
addressing adverse selection are still valid. 
The problem of adverse selection is one often raised by insur-
ers. Consider a simple case of a monogenic, late-onset disorder 
91 Draft Explanatory Report to the Draft Bioethics Convention, in ROGERS & DE 
BOUSINGEN, supra note 2 [hereinafter Draft Explanatory Report]. 
92 Id., 'IT 123 at 288. 
93 The commentary accompanied Article 18 of the Draft Convention, which provided 
as follows: "The communication of results of genetic testing outside the health field may 
only be allowed in accordance with the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 2, of this con-
vention." Draft Convention, supra note 50, art. 18. Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Draft 
Convention stated that nations may restrict the rights provided for under the Convention 
in the following cases: "in the interest of public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of public health or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others." Id., irt. 2, 'IT 2. 
These same exceptions are now contained in Article 26 of the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine. Unlike the Draft Convention, however, the Convention on Hu-
man Rights and Biomedicine provides that certain rights, such as Article ll's right to be 
free from discrimination based on genetic heritage, may not be abridged, even to protect 
public safety, public health, or the rights and freedoms of others, or to prevent public 
disorder or crime. Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 6, art. 26, 
'll'll1 &2. 
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such as Huntington's disease.94 Suppose Barb and Carl, a 30-
year old couple, visit their physician for the testing of 
Huntington's disease, which runs in Carl's family. Carl tests 
positive for the disease, which means he will develop the disor-
der and most likely die during his fifties. 95 Carl decides to take 
out a life insurance policy.96 The insurance company may not 
force him to undergo genetic testing, but may the company ask 
about his genetic history, e.g., members of his family with 
Huntington's disease, and/or about the results of previously con-
ducted genetic tests? The insurer's request does not violate Arti-
cle 12 because asking for genetic information is not genetic test-
ing; the request, however, may violate Article 11. 
Article 11 provides that "[a]ny form of discrimination against a 
person on grounds of his or her genetic inheritance is prohibit-
ed."97 This anti-discrimination provision was not included in the 
Draft Convention and on its face appears to brook no exceptions. 
The Explanatory Report states that the term "discrimination" 
means "unfair discrimination," but does not elaborate on, or 
provide examples of, what the drafters meant by the term 
"fair."98 
94 For a discussion of the adverse selection problem, see generally Richard A. Ep-
stein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology, 
72 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
"' See Nancy Wexler, Presymptomatic Testing for Huntington's Disease: Harbinger of 
the New Genetics, in GENETICS, ETHICS, AND HUMAN VALUES, PROC. XXNTH CIOMS 
CONF., supra note 44, at 80. 
96 Neither the language of Article 12 nor that of the Explanatory Report distinguish-
es between health insurance policies, on the one hand, and life or disability insurance 
policies, on the other hand. Thus, Article 12's prohibition on testing appears to apply to 
providers of health, life, and disability insurance. 
"
7 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 6, art. 11. 
•• As an example of "fair" discrimination, the Explanatory Report states that the 
Convention "cannot prohibit positive measures which may be implemented with the aim 
of re-establishing a certain balance in favour of those at a disadvantage because of their 
genetic inheritance." Explanatory Report, supra note 4, 'll 77 at 17-18 (emphasis added). 
This sounds like genetic affirmative action, but does not help much in defining the bound-
aries of what the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine means by the term "dis-
crimination." 
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Suppose the insurance company will deny the application for 
insurance if it discovers that Carl carries the genetic marker for 
Huntington's disease. Is such a denial "unfair" discrimination? 
Suppose the insurer simply intends to charge more for the insur-
ance, but the higher premium is based on genetic information. In 
other words, if there is an empirical or actuarial basis for distin-
guishing between two applicants for insurance, does that empiri-
cal distinction make the insurer's action "fair"? This is an impor-
tant question because the insurance industry is based on these 
types of actuarial distinctions about risk. 
Further, suppose Carl lies to the insurance company about the 
results of his genetic test. The company later discovers this infor-
mation and seeks to avoid its obligation under the life insurance 
contract. The insurance company would not necessarily prevail 
because the insurer might not be able to claim any harm as a 
result of the falsehood. Depending on the definition of what con-
stitutes "fair" and "unfair" discrimination, Article 11 may pre-
clude an insurer from using any genetic information, whether it 
be in providing or denying coverage, or in setting insurance 
rates. If that were the case, an insurer would be hard-pressed to 
sue for fraud based on misrepresentation of genetic health, when 
the law precludes the insurer from using that information in 
denying insurance or in setting premiums. Unfortunately, nei-
ther the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine nor the 
Explanatory Report provides much guidance on how to resolve 
any of these issues. 
2. Compulsory Genetic Testing by Employers and Insurers -
In the United States 
a. Employers 
In the United States, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA)99 provides the starting point for any analysis of medical 
testing in the employment setting. The ADA creates a three-
!l9 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1995). 
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phase system: (i) pre-employment, (ii) post-offer, pre-employ-
ment, and (iii) employment. The employer's ability to conduct 
medical examinations and use information derived therefrom 
varies, depending on the stage of employment.100 
The ADA, like the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedi-
cine, prohibits pre-employment genetic testing. 101 The ADA's 
prohibitions do not specifically mention genetic tests; instead, 
the ADA speaks in terms of medical examinations. Given their 
intrusive nature and the fact that genetic tests are conducted by 
medical personnel for determining biological conditions, genetic 
tests fall within the meaning of the term "medical examination." 
After the employer makes an offer of employment and before 
the employee commences work, the employer may conduct genet-
ic tests, so long as the employer satisfies certain conditions. 
First, the employer may not single out certain employees for 
genetic testing. The employer must subject "all entering employ-
ees ... to such an examination regardless of disability."102 Sec-
ond, the employer must keep all results of genetic tests in "sepa-
rate medical files" and, with certain exceptions, treat the results 
"as a confidential medical record."103 Finally, although the ADA 
allows the employer to conduct genetic tests prior to actual em-
ployment, the ADA restricts the employer's use of the results of 
those tests. Thus, the employer may only revoke an offer of em-
ployment, based on genetic exam results, if the decision is ''job-
related and consistent with business necessity."104 
As a result, employers' use of genetic information at the pre-
employment, post-offer stage is fairly restricted. For all practical 
purposes, it appears that the job-relatedness and business neces-
sity requirements would foreclose almost all attempts by an 
1110 The ADA's prohibitions and restrictions on medical exams apply regardless of 
whether the medical examination tests for a disability. See id. § 12112(d). For a discus-
sion of whether the ADA applies to discrimination against healthy persons who carry 
genes for certain disorders, see infra text accompanying notes 141-45. 
101 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2) (1995). 
1112 Id. § 12112(d)(3)(A). 
1111 Id. § 12112(d)(3)(B)(i)-(iii). 
104 Id. § 12112(d)(3)(C), (d)(4)(A). 
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employer to use the results of genetic tests to revoke an offer of 
employment. The increased cost of employing a worker with a 
genetic marker for a disease or a genetic predisposition to dis-
ease does not satisfy the job-relatedness and business necessity 
requirements. Title VII and other civil rights case law attest to 
the basic proposition that cost alone does not satisfy the business 
necessity test.105 
Does this mean that, despite apparent differences in language, 
the ADA and the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
achieve similar results? No. To begin with, at the post-offer, pre-
employment stage, the ADA, unlike the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine, shifts the ultimate burden of proving 
discrimination as a result of genetic testing from the employer to 
the employee. 
Consider an example proffered by Professor Mark 
Rothstein.106 Ann applies for, and is offered, a job with Compa-
ny A, which conducts post-offer, pre-employment medical exams. 
Ann gives her consent to the company nurse to withdraw blood. 
When questioned, however, the nurse, correctly citing company 
policy, refuses to disclose the nature of the tests to be conducted 
on Ann's blood. The tests reveal that Ann carries a recessive 
gene for Duchenne muscular dystrophy, which means that a 
male child of hers will have a 50% chance of having the muscu-
lar dystrophy gene. Company A, concerned about its increasing 
medical costs, revokes the offer to Ann. 
Now, of course, the fact that Company A first made, and then 
revoked, an offer to Ann after she underwent a medical exami-
105 The United States Supreme Court addressed the cost issue in the context of sex 
discrimination in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 
(1991). The Court rejected the argument that an employer's exposure to increased tort 
liability served as a defense to sex discrimination under Title VII: "[T]he specter of an 
award of damage reflects a fear that hiring fertile women will cost more. The extra cost 
of employing members of one sex, however, does not provide an affirmative Title VII 
defense for a discriminatory refusal to hire members of that gender." Id. at 210 (citation 
omitted). 
106 Mark A. Rothstein, Discrimination Based on Genetic Information, 33 JURIMETRICS 
J. 13, 15 (1992). 
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nation raises a presumption of improper action. Nonetheless, as 
Professor Rothstein aptly notes, "the ADA does not alter the 
common law rule: there is no requirement that individuals be 
told what medical tests are being run, what the results are (be-
cause there is no physician-patient relationship), or why a condi-
tional offer of employment has been withdrawn."107 As a result, 
Ann is working in the dark. And, in order to determine whether 
Company A revoked the offer to her on the basis of her medical 
examination, Ann must initiate legal action. All of this also as-
sumes that Ann's status as a carrier of a recessive gene for mus-
cular dystrophy qualifies as a disability under the ADA 
The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, by com-
parison, imposes a flat-out prohibition on genetic testing, absent 
a health-related purpose. Thus, the burden lies with the employ-
er to justify any genetic test required of employees because ge-
netic testing is the exception to the rule. Under the ADA's 
scheme, post-offer, pre-employment genetic testing may be the 
rule; testing is allowed. What is not permitted is misuse of the 
results of those genetic tests. 
With regards to genetic testing of employees, the ADA and the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine are similar, 
though not identical, in two respects: voluntary health programs 
established by the employer and genetic monitoring of employees 
exposed to workplace toxins. Under the ADA, the employer may 
offer voluntary genetic tests and genetic histories as part of an 
employee health program.108 The Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine bans all genetic testing, even voluntary 
tests,109 unless the employer can demonstrate a health reason 
107 ld. at 16. 
'"" 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B) (1995). Of course, the employer must keep the results of 
these genetic tests and histories in separate, confidential files, and may only terminate 
an employee on the basis of such genetic tests and histories if the decision is job-related 
and satisfies a business necessity. I d. § 12112(d)(4)(C). The issue of confidentiality of em-
ployment-related health records is Jess clear under the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine. See infra notes 124-40 and accompanying text for discussion of the Data 
Protection Convention. 
'"" Article 12 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine prohibits genetic 
testing "for reasons other than health or health-related research, even with the assent of 
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for the genetic test. Thus, it is possible to interpret the ADA to 
permit employers to establish voluntary genetic tests as part of 
an employer-sponsored health program. 
The ADA, like the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedi-
cine, permits employers to conduct medical exams of employees 
exposed to workplace toxins. The ADA's implementing regula-
tions provide, in pertinent part, as follows: 
This provision also permits ... other medical monitoring if 
such monitoring [is] required by medical standards or other 
requirements established by Federal, State, or local law 
that are consistent with the ADA and this part . . . in that 
they are job-related and consistent with business necessity 
These standards also include health standards promulgated 
pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 ... or other similar statutes that require that employ-
ees exposed to certain toxic and hazardous substances be 
medically monitored at specific intervals.110 
While both the ADA and the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine contemplate such workplace genetic monitoring, 
there are differences in their approaches. First, the ADA affords 
the employee some protection with regard to the results of genet-
ic monitoring: the employer must keep such results in confiden-
tial medical files. It is less clear how the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine protects the employee with regard to the 
confidentiality of such test results.m Second, the ADA requires 
that genetic monitoring satisfy the job-related and business ne-
cessity tests, while the Convention on Human Rights and Bio-
medicine requires that monitoring be carried out for the health 
of the worker. While these two standards permit and prohibit 
the person concerned." Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 6, 'll 85 
at 19 (emphasis added). 
110 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.14(c) (1995) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
111 See infra notes 124-40 and accompanying text for discussion of the Data Protec-
tion Convention. 
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many of the same types of genetic monitoring, their foci differ. 
Evaluating job-relatedness and business necessity focuses on the 
employee's ability to perform assigned work. Alternatively, a 
focus on employee health bears no necessary relationship to per-
formance at work. 
This distinction reveals a fundamental difference in philosophy 
between the ADA and the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine. 112 The ADA requires a balancing of the employer's 
financial interests against the rights of the employee. The Con-
vention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on the other hand, 
starts from the position that the individual has a fundamental 
right to control his or her genetic information. Balancing, there-
fore, does not enter into the equation. Employers may test to 
protect the health of the individual, but not to protect the finan-
cial well being of the company. 
b. Insurance Companies 
An employee's protection under the ADA against genetic test-
ing by insurers is much weaker than that offered against em-
ployer testing. The ADA's protections extend only to the 
employee's connection to the workplace. For example, an employ-
er could not refuse to hire an employee whose genetic test re-
vealed a genetic marker for breast cancer solely because that 
employee might increase the employer's health insurance 
costs. 113 
The real problem with the ADA is that its protection against 
genetic testing by insurers extends only to the employment rela-
tionship. The ADA does not prohibit insurers from inquiring 
about genetic information or prior genetic test results, nor does it 
112 Of course, when Congress drafted the ADA, it is not clear that it considered the 
ADA's ramifications for genetic testing. Thus, Congress may not have intended to create 
this distinction with regard to genetic testing when it drafted the ADA. Congress may 
still determine that, given the probabilistic and highly intrusive nature of genetic testing, 
that more stringent legislation is needed for genetic testing than for medical testing. 
'" See Frances H. Miller & Philip A. Huvos, Genetic Blueprints, Employer Cost-Cut-
ting, and The Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 369, 381-83 (1994). 
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preclude insurers from requiring insurance applicants to undergo 
genetic tests prior to obtaining, or modifying, insurance con-
tracts. Given the variability in causes and manifestations of 
genetic disorders, e.g., monogenic vs. multifactorial disorders, 
and issues of penetrance, mandatory testing also poses a prob-
lem for individuals seeking life or disability insurance. 
Congress recently addressed the issue of health insurance 
providers' use of genetic information in the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("Act").114 The Act 
prohibits a group health plan,115 or health insurance 
carrier, 116 from "establish[ing] rules for eligibility (including 
continued eligibility) [for] any individual to enroll under the 
terms of the plan based on ... medical history [or] genetic infor-
mation."117 In addition, neither a group health plan nor a 
health insurance issuer may 
require any individual (as a condition of enrollment or con-
tinued enrollment under the plan) to pay a premium or 
contribution which is greater than such premium or contri-
bution for a similarly situated individual enrolled in the 
plan on the basis of any health status-related factor [e.g., 
genetic information] in relation to the individual or to an 
individual enrolled under the plan as a dependent of the 
individual. 118 
114 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 
U.S.C.). 
11
' The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 defines a group 
health plan as "an employee welfare benefit plan to the extent that the plan provides 
medical care . . . to employees or their dependents . . . directly or through insurance, 
reimbursement, or otherwise." 29 U.S.C.A. § 1191b(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997). 
118 A health insurance issuer is "an insurance company, insurance service, or insur-
ance organization (including a health maintenance organization ... ) which is licensed to 
engage in the business of insurance in a State and which is subject to state law which 
regulates insurance .... " Id. § 1191b(b)(2). 
117 Id. § 1182(a)(l)(E), (F). 
IIR Id. § 1182(b)(1). 
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Thus, the Act creates significantly more protection for many 
Americans in obtaining and retaining health insurance coverage 
by establishing an outright ban on the use by health insurers of 
any genetic information, whether attained from genetic testing or 
from medical histories. 
There are gaps in the legislation, however. First, the Act al-
lows nonfederal governmental plans to opt out of its provisions, 
including the nondiscrimination sections, on a year-by-year ba-
sis. 119 The Act seems to permit nonfederal governmental plans 
to opt out indefinitely, so long as the plan follows the prescribed 
regulations and makes the yearly statutory election.120 
Second, the Act does not ban the use of genetic information by 
health insurers in the individual market, as it does in the group 
market. 121 Insurers providing health coverage in the individual 
market may not deny coverage on the basis of a pre-existing con-
dition. But the Act specifically excludes genetic information from 
the definition of pre-existing condition, unless the genetic infor-
mation constitutes a diagnosed condition.122 
In these two situations-the employee covered by the nonfed-
eral governmental plan and the person insured through the 
"" ld. § 300gg-21(b)(2)(A), (B). 
120 Id. 
121 This distinction between individual and group markets is important. Most Ameri-
cans with health insurance are covered through their employers in some form of group 
plan. A sizable number of Americans, approximately 40 million, have no health insur-
ance. Alison Mitchell, Despite His Reversals, Clinton Stays Centered, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 
1996, at Al. These Americans will seek insurance in the individual market, where the 
combination of two factors-the absence oflarge groups over which to spread risk and the 
possibility of insurers using genetic information in assessing risk-may make health 
insurance coverage prohibitively expensive. 
'
22 29 U.S.C.A. § 1181(b){1)(A), (B) (West Supp. 1997). This raises an interesting ques-
tion. Consider the case of Carl, a man with the gene for Huntington's disease. Carl is not 
tested for the disease. At age 30, he decides to return to school for his Ph.D. He purchas-
es insurance through the individual health insurance market. At age 37, as he nears 
completion of his dissertation, Carl develops symptoms of Huntington's disease. His con-
dition worsens. His insurance company refuses to pay for his treatments, arguing that 
Huntington's disease is a pre-existing condition because the disease was not diagnosed at 
the time of insurance coverage and the genetic marker indicates that Carl had the dis-
ease, even though it was then ~dormant." 
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individual market-the Act provides no federal protection 
against misuse of genetic information. Therefore, the individual's 
only recourse is to turn to state law, which varies consider-
ably.123 
3. Requests for and Use of Otherwise Available Genetic 
Information-In Europe 
The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine clearly 
prohibits most forms of mandatory genetic testing. By doing so, 
the amount of genetic information available to employers and 
insurers is sharply restricted. Nonetheless, Article 12's prohibi-
tion on even voluntary predictive genetic testing leaves some 
gaps. First, genetic testing is one way of obtaining genetic infor-
mation. Physicians, however, commonly obtain genetic informa-
tion from patients by constructing family histories of disease. For 
'"'' At least eight states have enacted legislation in response to the Human Genome 
Project. A few states have legislation, dating back to the 1970s, that prohibits an insurer 
from refusing to insure on the basis of specific, limited genetic disorders, e.g., sickle cell 
anemia. 
Florida and Alabama laws prohibit insurers from denying coverage on the basis 
of the sickle cell trait. North Carolina prohibits insurers from denying coverage 
because the applicant has the hemoglobin C or sickle cell trait. Maryland pro-
hibits discrimination in rates based on any genetic trait unless there is actuari-
al justification ... California, Oregon, Colorado, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Ohio, 
Georgia, and New Hampshire ... prohibit insurers, to varying degrees, from re-
quiring or requesting genetic tests or their results, from denying coverage on 
the basis of genetic tests, and from using tests to determine rates and benefits. 
California, Colorado, Oregon, and Wisconsin laws include provisions to protect 
the privacy of genetic information. 
Kathy Hudson et al., Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance: An Urgent Need for 
Reform, Fig. 1 (visited July 25, 1996) <http://www.edoc.com/aaas/policy/genetics.html>; 
see also Neil A. Holtzman, Panel Comment: The Attempt to Pass the Genetic Priuacy Act 
in Maryland, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 367 (1995); Arpiar G. Saunders, Jr. & Bennett B. 
Mortell, Genetic Testing-Genetic Discrimination: State and Federal Statutes Prouide Possi-
ble Remedies, 36 N.H. BAR J. 23 (1995). 
California's approach most closely approximates that taken by many European coun-
tries. In effect, California's recently enacted legislation amounts to a six year moratorium 
on genetic testing by insurance companies. Certain sections of the legislation, which pro-
hibit discrimination in insurance coverage, premiums, terms and conditions, expire on 
January 1, 2002, unless the state legislature enacts replacement legislation. 1995 Cal. 
Adv. Legis. Serv. 695 (Deering). 
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example, a woman with a family history of breast cancer is at 
greater risk of developing breast cancer. This information is 
genetic in nature but not obtained by predictive genetic tests. 
Second, as predictive genetic tests become available, certain 
people will want to take advantage of those tests. 124 
Thus, two questions arise. First, may an employer or an insur-
er make inquiries about an employee's or insurance applicant's 
family history, or about the results of prior genetic testing? Sec-
ond, may an employer or, more likely, an insurer obtain medical 
information that contains genetic information in the form of 
family histories? Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine provide some answers. 
Article 10 provides that "[e]veryone has the right to respect for 
private life in relation to information about his or her 
health."125 Article 11 states that "[a]ny form of discrimination 
against a person on grounds of his or her genetic heritage is 
prohibited."126 Article 10 draws upon language in Article 8 of 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, 127 which, in turn, draws upon Article 12 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.128 These three 
Articles rest on conceptions of personal privacy, which suggest 
that, at a minimum, consent is required prior to disclosure of 
personal information, such as genetic family histories or prior 
genetic test results. Thus, read together, Articles 10 and 11 of 
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine suggest that 
genetic information, regardless of its source, is private and, if 
124 Right now, a test exists for detecting the gene for Huntington's disease. Although 
there is no cure, some people are availing themselves of this test in order to make family 
planning decisions. 
1
"-' Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 6, art. 10. 
126 ld. art. 11. 
127 Article 8 provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]veryone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence." Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 55, art. 8, 'l! 1. 
128 Article 12 states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 54, art. 12. 
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used by insurers or employers to distinguish between employees 
or insurance applicants, amounts to prohibited discrimination 
under the Convention. 
Calling information private, however, does not mean that it 
may not be accessed. With consent, insurers, for example, could 
obtain private genetic information. The problem with this formu-
lation is that insurers could condition insurance coverage on 
answering questions about genetic history or testing, or provid-
ing access to results of previously conducted genetic tests. Noth-
ing in the concept of privacy per se prohibits such conduct. 
In redrafting the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedi-
cine, the CDBI deleted Article 18, which established an outright 
ban on the communication of genetic test results. Prior to dele-
tion, Article 18 provided that "[t]he communication of results of 
genetic testing outside the health field [could] only be allowed" in 
certain limited situations, e.g., to prevent crime.129 The Draft 
Explanatory Report specifically noted the CDBI's concern that 
absent restrictions on release of genetic test results to third 
parties, such as insurers, individuals might hesitate to undergo 
needed genetic testing. 
People should have unhindered access to genetic testing 
which may serve their health purposes. In order to be able 
to take advantage of these techniques in the health care 
setting, external factors which might interfere with people's 
free choice to use genetic services in health care should be 
barred .... 
Therefore it is important to prevent third parties from 
making use of genetic information which the individual has 
acquired by making use of genetic services in health care. 
This holds in particular when the attainment of social 
goods is involved (for instance, employment, life, health and 
disability insurance). Therefore, the communication of re-
sults of genetic testing acquired in the framework of health 
care for other purposes is forbidden, notwithstanding the 
129 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 6, art. 18. 
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free contractual relationship. Otherwise, the individual 
could refuse to undergo a test and obtain essential informa-
tion about his or her health because of the fear of conse-
quences. 130 
Despite the concerns expressed in the Draft Explanatory Report, 
the CDBI deleted Article 18 from the final draft of the Conven-
tion because the CDBI proved unable to "agree[] on a satisfacto-
ry text."131 The Council of Europe, however, has not spoken 
with finality on the issue of communication of genetic test re-
sults. The Committee of Ministers has entrusted the CDBI with 
the task of drafting a protocol on the use of genetic informa-
tion.132 
The decision to delete Article 18 from the revised Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine may have aroused less con-
cern within the CDBI, in part, because of the existence of the 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Au-
tomatic Processing of Personal Data ("Data Protection Conven-
tion").133 Article 12 of the Draft Convention contained a right to 
privacy, drafted in language similar to that currently at Article 
10 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. The 
Draft Explanatory Report accompanying the Draft Convention 
provides a thumbnail pedigree of this right to privacy. 
The first paragraph [of Article 12] establishes the right of 
privacy in the health field, thereby reaffirming the principle 
introduced in Article 8 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights and reiterated in the Convention for the Protec-
130 Draft Explanatory Report, supra note 91, 'll'll 121-22 at 287-88. 
'" Letter from Carlos de Sola, Secretary of the Steering Committee on Bioethics 
(CDBI), Council of Europe, to Anne Lawton, Assistant Professor, Miami University (May 
30, 1997) (on file with author). 
'·'
2 In his letter dated May 30, 1997, Carlos de Sola, the Secretary of the CDBI, said 
that the "Committee of Ministers [had] entrusted the CDBI to deal with the use of genet-
ic information when preparing the protocol on genetics." ld. Mr. de Sola "guess[ed] [that] 
this [would] be one of the most significant parts of the future protocol." !d. 
""' Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data, opened for signature Jan. 28, 1981, E.T.S. No. 108 ["Data Protection 
Convention"]. 
1997] REGULATING GENETIC DESTINY 
tion of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data. It should be pointed out that, under Article 
6 of the latter Convention, personal data concerning health 
constitute a special category of data and are as such subject 
to special rules. 134 
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Thus, the drafters of the Convention on Human Rights and Bio-
medicine may have believed that by retaining the right to priva-
cy, which draws upon the Data Protection Convention, they pro-
vided the necessary protection against release of private genetic 
information. The problem is that the so-called special rules for 
health data in the Data Processing Convention, while encom-
passing both genetic test results and genetic family histories, are 
simply not as specific as Article 18's outright prohibition on com-
munication of genetic test results. 
The Data Protection Convention imposes on parties an obliga-
tion to provide national legal rules consistent with its basic prin-
ciples. The basic principles of the Data Protection Convention 
fall into three categories: (i) q:uality control of the data 
collected/35 (ii) protections against security breaches/36 and 
(iii) access to the information by the data subject.137 The Data 
Protection Convention covers any "storage," "alteration, erasure, 
retrieval or dissemination" of personally identifiable data by 
automated, or partially automated, means.138 
In addition to these general principles applicable to all forms 
of automatically processed data, Article 6 of the Data Protection 
Convention provides so-called "special rules" for certain catego-
ries of data. The problem, as mentioned above, is that these 
134 Draft Explanatory Report, supra note 91, 'll91 at 280-81 (emphasis added). 
"'' Data Protection Convention, supra note 133, art. 5. 
a:Js Id. art. 7. 
137 Id. art. 8. 
1311 Id. art. 2(a), (c). The drafters of the Data Protection Convention were primarily 
concerned with automatic processing of data, because by permitting easier and quicker 
access to information, automation makes it more likely that third parties will seek out 
this information. Nonetheless, the Data Protection Convention provides that parties to 
the convention may give notice, upon ratification, that they intend to "apply [the] conven-
tion to personal data files which are not processed automatically." Id. art. 3(2)(c). 
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special rules are not at all specific. Article 6 states only that 
"personal data concerning health or sexual life [] may not be 
processed automatically unless domestic law provides appropriate 
safeguards. "139 The definition or parameters of "appropriate 
safeguards" are nowhere enunciated in the Data Protection Con-
vention. 140 
In conclusion, Article 12 of the Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine circumscribes the scope of available genetic 
information by severely restricting the use of predictive genetic 
testing by employers and insurers. Article 12, however, only 
prohibits employers and insurers from requiring or requesting 
individuals to undergo genetic testing; it does not preclude the·m 
from asking about prior test results or other genetic information, 
e.g., family histories of disease. And while Article 10 protects 
privacy rights in health information, it does not preclude insur-
ers or employers from conditioning benefits upon the provision of 
genetic information. Article 11 steps into the breach and prohib-
its, without limitation, all forms of genetic discrimination. But 
unlike the Draft Convention, the Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine does not per se prohibit communication of ge-
netic test results. Therefore, the individual bears the burden to 
demonstrate that the information released resulted in genetic 
discrimination.141 
119 Id. art. 6 (emphasis added). 
140 The European Union currently is working to reconcile differences in Member 
States' laws on automatic processing of personal data. In February 1995, the Council of 
the European Union adopted a Common Position on a proposed European Union Direc-
tive. Article 8 of the proposed Directive provides that Member States of the European 
Union "shall prohibit ... the processing of data concerning health or sex life." Article 8 
then proceeds to enunciate certain exceptions, including processing "for the purposes of 
preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of care or treatment or the manage-
ment of health-care services," where this processing is done by a health professional or 
other person subject to national rules concerning professional secrecy. Common Position 
(EC) No/94 With a View to Adopting Directive 94/ /EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data. (copy on file with Consultancy Europe 
Associates Ltd. and may be ordered via e-mail at <westlaw.doc@spicers.co.uk>). 
141 Compare with the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine's allocation of 
burdens in the context of genetic testing. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07. 
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4. Requests for and Use of Otherwise Available Genetic 
Information-In the United States 
413 
Once again, the approach in the United States, unlike that in 
Europe, differs depending on whether the discussion involves 
employers' versus insurers' use of genetic information. Because 
the ADA provides some guidance with regard to employers, that 
is the starting point for the analysis. 
May employers request information about prior genetic test 
results or ask employees questions that lead to genetic family 
histories? The answer to this question under the ADA is less 
clear than for employers' use of medical examinations, such as 
genetic tests. The provisions in the ADA on medical examina-
tions cover all medical exams, regardless of whether their intent 
is to reveal the presence of a disability. 
However, inquiries about genetic testing and family history 
require an analysis of the disability question because an employ-
er, with certain exceptions, may not ask a job applicant or em-
ployee questions about the applicant's or employee's disability 
status.142 Thus, an employer's ability to question job applicants 
and employees about genetic information turns on whether pos-
sessing a genetic predisposition to disease qualifies as a disabili-
ty. Because the ADA was enacted in 1990 at the inception of the 
Human Genome Project in the United States, there is almost no 
legislative history discussing the application of the ADA to ge-
netic conditions. Clearly, manifested genetic illnesses, such as 
multiple sclerosis, are covered by the ADA. But are persons with 
genetic markers for, but no manifested symptoms of, a disease 
disabled under the ADA? One commentator claims that recent 
guidelines by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) suggest that the answer to this question is "yes:" 
On March 14, 1995, the EEOC issued a new section to its 
Compliance Manual in which it addresses this emerging 
problem . . . . [T]he new section of the Compliance Manual 
142 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A), (d)(4)(A) (1995). 
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concludes ... that individuals who are subjected to discrim-
ination on the basis of "genetic information relating to ill-
ness, disease, or other disorders" are being regarded as 
having disabling impairments. Thus, these individuals are 
covered by the ADA.143 
Thus, the ADA's language on inquiries about disabilities tracks 
the language with regard to medical examinations, and the same 
analysis applies. 144 
The more difficult question, once again, is whether any restric-
tions exist with regard to insurers' requests for or use of genetic 
information. The ADA precludes discriminatory use of disability 
information in the provision of the conditions and benefits of 
employment, which includes health insurance coverage.145 Yet, 
until recently, an insurance applicant, outside the work place, 
had no consistent federal protection against requests for genetic 
test results or from insurers conditioning the provision of insur-
ance coverage upon disclosure of genetic information. The pas-
sage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996 rectified some of these shortcomings in the provision of 
health insurance. With certain exceptions, the Act affords protec-
tion to applicants for health insurance against requests for and 
misuse of genetic information by insurance companies. But nei-
ther the Act nor any other federal law specifically protects indi-
viduals from requests for and misuse of genetic information in 
the formation of life and disability insurance contracts. 
Prior to the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996, ELSI funded a legislative drafting 
project undertaken by George Annas, Leonard Glantz, and Patri-
cia Roche of the Boston University School of Public Health. 
Annas, Glantz and Roche drafted the Genetic Privacy Act 
141 Joseph S. Alper, Does the ADA Provide Protection Against Discrimination on the 
Basis of Genotype?, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 167, 168 (1995) (citations omitted). 
144 See supra text accompanying notes 99-111. 
145 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). 
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(GPA)146 as a model for federal legislation. The drafters com-
mented: 
[T]he overarching premise of the Act IS that no stranger 
should have or control identifiable DNA samples or genetic 
information about an individual unless that mdiVIdual 
specifically authorizes the collection of DNA samples for the 
purpose of genetic analysis, authorizes the creation of that 
private information, and has access to and control over the 
dissemmation of that informat10n.147 
The GPA operates through a fairly rigorous set of consent and 
notification guidelines. Suppose Bob applies for life insurance 
with Company C, which wants a DNA sample prior to providing 
coverage. Under the GPA, Company C must obtain written au-
thorization from Bob before obtaining any DNA samples from 
him. 148 The authorization, in addition to being in writing and 
signed by Bob, must contain seven other pieces of information, 
including the proposed uses of the DNA sample and whether Bob 
consents to storage after collection.149 Prior to actual collection, 
the collector of the DNA sample also must inform Bob orally of 
certain rights he possesses, including the right to voluntary 
consent to DNA testing and the right to genetic counseling.150 
More importantly, the GPA prohibits the redisclosure of informa-
tion, particularly given the sharing of information among life 
insurers that subscribe to the MIB, which collects medical in-
formation about insurance applicants.151 Therefore, even if an 
insurer conditions life insurance coverage upon successful com-
pletion of a genetic test, that insurer could not disclose the re-
sults of that genetic test to the MIB without violating the provi-
sions of the Genetic Privacy Act. 
146 George Annas et al., The Genetic Pnuacy Act and Commentary (modified May 
1995) <http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/resource/pnvacy/pnvacy.html> 
147 Id. 
148 Id. § 102(a). 
149 Id. § 103(a)(1)(8) <http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/resource/ 
pnvacy/pnvacy2.html>. 
150 Id. § lOl(b){l)-(11). 
151 Id. § lll(b). 
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Perhaps the most unusual provision in the GPA is section 104. 
Section 104 states that "[a]n individually identifiable DNA sam-
ple is the property of the sample source."152 This is unusual be-
cause the GPA is written as a piece of model federal legislation. 
While nothing precludes federal law from creating property 
rights, this is generally a function of state law. In addition, the 
creation of property rights in DNA raises other issues because 
DNA simply codes for genetically manifested traits. Does this 
mean that human beings have property rights in their bodily tis-
sues and organs?153 The Commentary to the GPA does not ad-
dress this issue. The GPA's drafters established this property 
right, in part, to give individuals the right to order, except in 
limited circumstances, the destruction of the DNA sample after 
completion of any authorized procedures on the DNA sample. 154 
The GPA, therefore, protects against disclosure of genetic test 
results through a combination of legislatively created privacy 
and property rights. Although it provides more protection against 
the use of genetic information than currently exists, there are 
two gaps in its coverage. 
First, the GPA only covers genetic test results, not information 
provided by genetic family histories. 155 The drafters of the GPA 
decided not to include genetic information garnered through 
family histories because "[e]xtending the umbrella of protection 
through such an expansive definition would necessitate the over-
'" Id. § 104(a). 
'""
1 Compare Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 
87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (1993) ("[S]everal of the prominent [property] justification 
theories support recognizing an individual's protectable property interest in the informa-
tion encoded in his genetic material.") with Margaret S. Swain and Randy W. Marusyk, 
An Alternative to Property Rights in Human Tissue, HAsTINGS CTR. REP. 12 (Sept./Oct. 
1990) ("We propose instead a legal structure in which transplantable human tissue en-
tails no property rights, but in which such rights can be created in new forms of tissue 
through the investment of labor."). See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 
479 (Cal. 1990). 
••• George Annas et al., supra note 146, § 104(b) <http://www.ornl.govtrechResources/ 
Human_Genome/resource/privacy/privacy2.html>; id. at 5-6 <http://www.ornl.gov/TechRe-
sources/Human_Genome/resource/privacy/privacy5.html>. 
15
" See id. at§ 3(M) <http://www.ornl.govtrechResources/Human_Genome/resource/ 
privacy/privacy4.html>. 
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haul of well established medical information practices and poli-
. cies."156 Some commentators, including some members of the 
ELSI Working Group, disagree with such an approach for health 
care insurance: ''Meaningful protection against genetic discrimi-
nation requires that insurers be prohibited from using all infor-
mation about genes, gene products, or inherited characteristics to 
deny or limit health insurance coverage."157 
Second, the GPA does not preclude insurers, for example, from 
conditioning health, life, or disability insurance coverage on the 
results of genetic tests or the provision of genetic information. 
Instead, it relies on controlling access to genetic information by 
establishing consent and notification requirements prior to re-
lease of such information.158 Given the fairly rigorous disclo-
sure and notification requirements, and the prohibition on 
redisclosure, however, the practical impact of the law may be to 
dampen insurers' enthusiasm for genetic testing. 
CONCLUSION 
It is still early in the development of the science of genetics. 
Important discoveries, however, have been made in the last de-
cade alone, and regulation is sorely needed. Legislative efforts to 
regulate both genetic testing and the uses of genetic information 
have occurred in Europe and in the United States. The European 
approach, however, is distinct from that in the United States in 
two respects: first, the Europeans have engaged in a comprehen-
sive study of the varied implications of genetic research, and 
second, the Europeans have created a human rights framework 
for analyzing issues related to the uses of genetic research and 
genetic information. Thus, national efforts to regulate fall within 
a broader legal framework shaped by the Council of Europe. 
1116 Id. at 2 <http://www.ornl.govtrechResources!Human_Genome/resource/privacy/ 
privacy4.html>. 
157 Hudson et al., supra note 123, at 3. 
1
"" George Annas et al., supra note 146, § lll(a) <http://www.ornl.govtrechResources/ 
Human_Genome/resource/privacy/privacy2.html>. 
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By comparison, efforts within the United States have separat-
ed the insurance and employment issues from the numerous 
other legal issues raised by the Human Genome Project and 
have attempted to solve these problems by placing them within 
traditional categories of United States law, e.g., privacy, civil 
rights, and/or property law.159 This is the traditional approach 
to legal analysis and lawmaking within the United States: carve 
up the legal problem into recognizable legal patterns, find analo-
gies within existing United States law, and then solve the legal 
issue(s) by applying an existing legal paradigm from traditional 
United States legal theory to the so-called "new" legal problem. 
Such efforts to compartmentalize legal issues actually has re-
sulted in a fusion of traditional legal categories because the 
employment and insurance issues raised by the Human Genome 
Project do not fit neatly into existing categories of United States 
law. Hence, some of the existing state statutes and proposed 
legislative models combine traditional civil rights law, e.g., along 
an ADA model, with concepts derived from privacy law. Or, as 
with the model federal Genetic Privacy Act, they combine privacy 
law concepts with property law notions. 160 Only time will tell 
whether the traditional approach to lawmaking in the United 
States is up to the challenge posed by the Human Genome Pro-
ject. 
159 See, e.g., Genetic Fairness Act of 1996, S. 1600, 104th Cong. (1996); Genetic Priva-
cy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1995, S. 1416, 104th Cong. (1995); Medical Records Con-
fidentiality Act of 1995, S. 1360, 104th Cong. (1995); Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimi-
nation Act of 1995, H.R. 2690, 104th Cong. (1995); George J. Annas et al., supra note 146 
<http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/resource/privacy/privacy.html> 
(proposed model federal legislation); Barry Brown, Genetic Testing, Access to Genetic 
Data, and Discrimination: Conceptual Legislative Models, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1573 
(1993); Neil A. Holtzman, Panel Comment: The Attempt to Pass the Genetic Privacy Act in 
Maryland, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 367 (1995); Ellen R. Peirce, The Regulation of Genetic 
Testing in the Workplace-A Legislative Proposal, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 771 (1985) (pre-ADA 
article); Saunders & Mortell, supra note 123, at 23. 
'
60 For example, should federal law create property rights in human genetic material, 
as proposed by the drafters of the model federal Genetic Privacy Act? These attempts to 
regulate also draw into question the level at which regulation should and can occur. 
